It is considered good distributed computing practice to devise object implementations that tolerate contention, periods of asynchrony and a large number of failures, but perform fast if few failures occur, the system is synchronous and there is no contention. This paper initiates the first study of quorum systems that help design such implementations. Namely, our study of quorum systems encompasses, at the same time, the optimal resilience of distributed object implementations (just like traditional quorum systems), as well as their optimal best-case complexity (unlike traditional quorum systems).
INTRODUCTION
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son about distributed implementations of shared objects including read/write storage (e.g., [3, 16, 22] ) and consensus [8, 18, 28] . In particular, quorum systems have been used to reason about implementations that tolerate asynchrony and are optimally resilient to process failures. Originally, a quorum system was defined as a set of subsets that intersect [9] , and this notion was key to reasoning about crash-resilient asynchronous algorithms. More sophisticated forms of quorum systems have been introduced to cope with Byzantine (malicious) failures [21] : these require larger intersections among subsets (i.e., quorums) [22] .
Perhaps surprisingly, most recent distributed object implementations, e.g., [1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 20, 23, 26, 29] make little use of an abstract quorum notion. The absence of such a notion makes it in particular difficult to move away from a threshold-based adversary structure with the assumptions of independent and uniformly distributed failures, often questioned in practice, to a general adversary structure. The reason for this absence is, we believe, because traditional quorum notions (be they simple or Byzantine), while very useful to reason about the resilience dimension, are not adequate to capture the complexity dimension, specifically the best-case one. The implementations in [1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 20, 23, 26, 29] were indeed devised to tolerate worst-case conditions, namely a large number of failures, arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony and contention. Motivated by practical considerations however, these implementations are also optimistic and geared to reduce best-case complexity, i.e., performance under situations of synchrony and no-contention, which are typically argued to be frequent in practice. As a consequence of their optimism, these implementations expedite operations in uncontended and synchronous situations, provided "enough" servers are accessed. Precisely capturing this very notion of "enough" in general terms was the motivation of this work.
This paper introduces the notion of refined quorum systems (RQS). In short, a refined quorum system of some set of elements S is a set of three classes of subsets (quorums) of S: first class quorums are also second class quorums, which are also third class quorums. Quorums (subsets of S) of the first class have large intersections with quorums of other classes, those of the second class might have slightly smaller intersections with those of the third class, the latter simply correspond to traditional quorums. In the context of a distributed object implementation, a set S would typically be the set of fault-prone server processes over which some object abstraction (e.g., storage or consensus) is implemented.
Example
To illustrate the intuition behind refined quorums, consider the simple context of a crash-resilient implementation of an atomic storage over a set of server processes [3] . It is known [6] that no optimally resilient atomic storage algorithm can have both reads and writes complete in a single communication round-trip (we simply say round), even if a single writer is involved (SWMR). For instance, the classical, optimally crash-resilient solution [3] (that assumes a majority of correct processes) requires two rounds for a read.
As we discussed earlier, it is practically appealing to look into best-case complexity and ask if it is possible to expedite both reads and writes within a single round in a synchronous and contention-free period. Clearly, if the reader (resp. the writer) access all servers in the first round, then it can immediately return a valid response. But do we need to access all servers? How many servers actually need to be accessed to achieve such a fast termination in best-case conditions? Consider the following simple example of 5 servers that implement a crash-tolerant atomic storage assuming t = 2 server failures (optimal resilience). We argue below that any algorithm that greedily expedites read/write operations in one round during synchronous and contention-free periods whenever S − t = 3 servers are accessed, violates atomicity. This is depicted through several executions of such an algorithm ( Figure 1 ):
1. In ex1, the writer w invokes wr = write(v) and servers 4 and 5 are faulty. Then, wr writes the value v into the subset of servers Q1 = {1, 2, 3} and completes in a single round.
2. Ex2 ( Fig. 1(a) ) is slightly different because servers 4 and 5 are actually correct. Yet wr also completes in a single round, after writing in Q1. Then servers 1 and 2 crash and a read rd (by the reader r) is invoked. Assuming synchrony and no contention, rd accesses server set Q2 = {3, 4, 5} and completes in a single round.
3. Ex3 ( Fig. 1(b) ) is similar to ex2 except that (1) the write is incomplete and writes only to server 3, (2) servers 1 and 2 (i.e., servers from the set Q2 \ Q1) are correct, but the communication between the reader and the servers from Q2 \ Q1 is delayed. Read rd does not distinguish ex3 from ex2 and completes in a single round, returning v.
4. Finally, consider ex4 ( Fig. 1(c) ) that extends ex3 by:
(1) the crash of servers 3 and 5 and (2) the invocation of read rd by a different reader r . This reader cannot return v using Q3 = {1, 2, 4} regardless of how many rounds are used. Atomicity is violated. Essentially, atomicity is violated because Q1∩Q2∩Q3 = ∅ (Figure 2(a) ). On the other hand, we can devise a storage algorithm that achieves fast termination whenever 4 servers are accessed. For instance:
• A write wr completes in a single round only if it writes v to 4 servers, say Q 1 = {1, 2, 3, 5}. A subsequent single-round read rd will also have to access at least 4 servers, say Q 2 = {2, 3, 4, 5} (including at least 3 servers from Q 1 ). A subsequent read rd that accesses some subset Q3 of 3 servers will surely learn about v since there is a set X = Q 1 ∩ Q 2 of (at least) 3 servers that witnessed both wr and rd, and X intersects with any set of 3 servers. This server in the intersection will inform rd about the value written by wr.
The key to atomicity is that (Figure 2 (b)) in a system of 5 elements, any two subsets of 4 elements intersect with any subset of 3 elements. Basically, boosting complexity requires to access subsets of servers that have larger intersections than traditional quorums. The above example is (relatively) simple because we were interested in the necessary and sufficient intersection properties considering: a) crash failures, b) threshold-based quorums and c) no graceful degradation.
The idea behind our notion of refined quorum system is precisely to characterize the required intersection properties in a precise and general manner. We aim at a characterization that is necessary and sufficient for optimizing the best-case complexity of various distributed object implementations, in various failure models, under various adversary structures, and also considering graceful degradation.
Contributions
Intuitively, under uncontended and synchronous conditions, a distributed object implementation would expedite an operation if a quorum of the first class is available, then degrade gracefully, depending on whether a quorum of the second or the third class is available. We argue that our quorum notion is, in a sense, complete: there is no reason for further refinement of quorums with the goal of optimizing best-case efficiency, since the properties provided by our third class quorums are anyway necessary for hindering the partitioning of the asynchronous system, which is key to any resilient distirbuted object implementation.
Our refined quorum systems are designed to handle a general adversary structure expressing situations where an adversary controls subsets of processes in a specific manner [15, 22] . As a consequence, this allows algorithms designed with such quorums to relax the assumption of independent process failures, often criticized in practice. In the full paper [13] we illustrate the power of our notion of RQS by introducing two new atomic object implementations. Each algorithm is interesting in its own right and is, in a precise sense, the first fully optimal protocol of its kind.
• Our first object implementation is a new Byzantineresilient asynchronous distributed storage algorithm. Such algorithms constitute an active area of research and are appealing alternatives to classical centralized storage systems based on specialized hardware [27] . The challenge when devising storage algorithms is to ensure that reads and writes have low latency in most frequent situations, while (a) tolerating the failures of a large number of base servers (typically commodity disks) as well as any number of clients that access the storage (wait-freedom [14] ) and (b) ensuring strong consistency (ideally atomicity [17] ). Using RQS, we present an atomic wait-free storage algorithm that combines optimal resilience with the lowest possible read/write latency in best-case conditions (synchrony and no-contention). Under such conditions, our algorithm expedites storage operations (reads and writes) in a single round if a first class quorum is accessed, in two rounds if a second class quorum is accessed and in three rounds otherwise. The latter case is when a third class quorum is available which is a necessary condition for resilience anyway. Our algorithm does not use any data authentication primitive, and matches the resilience and complexity lower bounds of [11, 24] when these are extended to a general adversary structure, together with a new complementary bound. Our new bound captures the best-case complexity of gracefully degrading atomic storage implementations.
• Our second algorithm implements a Byzantine-resilient consensus abstraction in the general state machine replication (SMR) framework of [18] , distinguishing different process roles: proposers that propose values to be learned by learners with the mediation of acceptors. Our algorithm is the first to tolerate (1) any number of Byzantine failures of proposers and learners, (2) the largest possible number of acceptor failures, and (3) arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony. On the other hand, under best-case conditions, our algorithm allows a value to be learned in only two message-delays in case a first class quorum is accessed, and in three (resp., four) message delays in case a second (resp., third) class quorum is accessed. Note here that (a) learning in a single message delay is obviously impossible with multiple or potentially Byzantine proposers, and (b) the availability of a third class quorum is anyway necessary for resilience. Our algorithm matches the resilience and complexity lower bounds of [19] when these are extended to a general adversary structure, together with a new complementary bound on consensus algorithms that degrade gracefully in best-case executions. These bounds state minimal conditions under which the SMR approach can be made optimally resilient and best-case efficient. Until now, it was not clear whether the conditions of [19] were also sufficient. We show they are and we complement them.
In this position paper we first present our quorum notion and illustrate how it generalizes previous ones through examples from the literature. Then, we point out some open research directions. We postpone the detailed model as well as our algorithms and their proofs to the full paper [13] .
REFINED QUORUM SYSTEMS
Definition of our refined quorum system is expressed in an environment including S a non-empty set of elements, and an adversary structure (or, simply, adversary) B defined as follows [15] . Let B be any set of subsets of S. B is an adversary (for the set S) if: ∀B ∈ B: B ⊆ B ⇒ B ∈ B.
Let RQS be any set of subsets of S.
Definition 1. Refined Quorum System. We say that RQS is a refined quorum system for a set S and adversary B, if RQS has two subsets QC1 ⊆ QC2 ⊆ RQS such that the following properties hold: (every QCi is called a quorum class, and elements of QCi are called class i elements) Property 1. An intersection of any two elements of RQS is not an element of B, i.e.,
Property 2. The intersection of any two class 1 elements and any element of RQS is not a subset of the union of any two elements of B, i.e.,
Property 3. The intersection of any class 2 element Q2 and any element Q of RQS is: (a) not a subset of the union of any two elements of B (we say P3a(Q2, Q) holds), or (b) its intersection with every class 1 element 1 is not an element of B (we say P 3b (Q2, Q) holds), i.e.,
• ∀Q2 ∈ QC2, ∀Q ∈ RQS, ∀B1, B2 ∈ B:
We simply call elements of a refined quorum systemquorums. In addition, for simplicity, we sometimes refer to any quorum that is not a class 2 quorums as a class 3 quorum, and write QC3 = RQS. Note that class 1 quorums are also class 2 quorums, which are also class 3 quorums. Notice also that, when QC1 = QC2, Property 2 implies Property 3. Furthermore, when B = ∅, Property 1 implies Property 3. Therefore, Property 3 is interesting on its own only if B = ∅ and QC1 = QC2.
Examples
We denote by Bk a k-bounded threshold adversary, a special case of an adversary that contains all subsets of S with cardinality at most k (i.e., Bk = {B|B ⊆ S ∧ |B| ≤ k}). Moreover, we denote by Qi the set of subsets of S that contains all subsets of S that contain all but at most i elements of S, i.e., Qi = {P |P ⊆ S ∧ |P | ≥ |S| − i}. Example 1. Figure 3 depicts a simple illustration of a RQS for an adversary B1: 4 quorums are involved. As depicted by the example, the cardinality of a quorum might not be a good indication of its class: it is the intersection with others that matters. Quorum Q1 contains 5 elements and is a class 1 quorum, while Q contains 6 elements yet is only an ordinary (or class 3) quorum.
To see that the quorum system in Figure 3 is indeed a RQS, note that every pair of depicted sets intersects in at least 2 elements (satisfying Property 1). Q1 intersects with every other set in at least 3 elements (satisfying Property 2, for an intersection with itself). Moreover, P3a(Q2, Q ) and P3a(Q2, Q1) hold (since |Q2 ∩ Q | = 2 = |Q2 ∩ Q1|) as well as P 3b (Q2, Q) (since |Q2 ∩ Q ∩ Q1| = 2). Hence, RQS = {Q, Q , Q2, Q1} is a refined quorum system, where Q1 (resp., Q2) is a class 1 (resp., class 2) quorum. In the following, we give more illustrations of our quorum notion by explaining how it generalizes traditional ones. In the following, an adversary B for a set of processes S contains all subsets of S that can simultaneously be Byzantine. Note that, in this paper, we do not consider a process that simply crashes to be Byzantine.
Example 2.
Consider the case where: (a) B = ∅, (b) QC1 = = QC2 = ∅ and (c) RQS = Q (|S|−1)/2 (i.e., every majority subset of S is a quorum). Property 1 is trivially satisfied. So are Properties 2 and 3, since QC1 = QC2 = ∅. This quorum system is typically used when devising algorithms that tolerate (a minority of) crash-failures, e.g., [3, 9, 18, 25] . In this case, each quorum contains more than two thirds of processes and satisfies Property 1. Properties 2 and 3 are also satisfied (since QC1 = QC2 = ∅). Such a quorum system is typically used to tolerate (up to one third of) Byzantine failures, e.g., [4, 5, 21, 24] .
Example 4. The RQS for which QC1 = QC2 = ∅ is a disseminating quorum system in the sense of [22] . In [22] , disseminating quorum systems are used to build resilient distributed services that store authenticated (also called self-verifying) data. On the other hand, the RQS in which QC1 = ∅ and QC2 = RQS is a masking quorum system in the sense of [22] . These systems have been used to build resilient distributed services that store unauthenticated data.
So far, in examples 2-4, we considered refined quorum systems in which QC1 = ∅. In the rest of the paper, we study the more general case where QC1 = ∅. This is the case where our refined quorum systems capture both the resilience and the best-case complexity dimensions of distributed algorithms.
Example 5. Consider the case of a RQS where ∅ = QC1 = QC2. Such a RQS was implicitly used in [20] , for the specific case B = ∅, to devise a consensus algorithm that tolerates asynchronous periods and a threshold t of process (crash) failures, yet expedites decisions in best-case scenarios. In fact, although not used in the algorithm, the idea of a fast quorum (class 1 quorum in our terminology) was used to explain the algorithm. In the special case of an adversary Bk, where (a) RQS = Qt, and (b) QC1 = QC2 = Qq (q ≤ t), Property 2 is satisfied if |S| > 2q + t + 2k and Property 1 is satisfied if |S| > 2t + k. These inequalities correspond to Lamport's lower bounds for "asynchronous" consensus [19] . The special case k = q = t (i.e., where QC1 = RQS) corresponds to the refined quorum system implicitly used in [1, 23] , also with the goal of boosting consensus latency.
Example 6. Even more interesting is the general case where ∅ = QC1 = QC2 ⊆ RQS (e.g., Fig. 3) , especially when RQS, QC1 and the adversary are defined as in Example 4, QC2 = Qr, and 0 ≤ q < r ≤ t. In other words, each quorum contains all but at most t processes, while class 1 (resp., class 2) quorums contain all but at most q (resp., r) elements. RQS satisfies (i) Property 1 if |S| > 2t + k, (ii) Property 2 if |S| > t + 2k + 2q, and (iii) Property 3 if |S| > t + r + k + min(k, q), i.e., RQS is a refined quorum system if |S| > t + k + max(t, k + 2q, r + min(k, q)). This quorum system was implicitly used in [7, 11] , and later in [29] .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper introduces the notion of refined quorum systems (RQS) and argues that this is a useful notion to reason about optimally resilient and efficient distributed object implementations. We show [13] that RQS are necessary and sufficient (or, in a sense, minimal) for implementing an important class of atomic objects, namely atomic storage and consensus. This minimality holds when we indeed require atomicity and do not rely on authentication primitives to cope with Byzantine failures in best-case executions.
In the above context, and roughly speaking, denoting the best possible latency of an object implementation by l1 2 (i.e., 1 round in the case of storage, or 2 message delays in the case of (Byzantine and asynchronous [19] ) consensus), and by l2 and l3, incrementally, the next best possible latencies according to the corresponding metric, we proposed RQS-based object implementations that achieve a latency of li whenever a quorum of class i is available and best-case conditions (namely, synchrony and no-contention) are met. Since Property 1 of RQS (defined on class 3 quorums) is anyway necessary for any resilient implementation of distributed storage and consensus in an asynchronous environment, there is no need for refining quorums further. It might be important to notice here that the very notion of refined quorum system helps highlight the information structure of optimally resilient and best-case efficient atomic object implementations (at least those implementing the abstractions of atomic storage or consensus). Basically, these implementations inherently have three rounds together with a backup subprotocol in case of asynchrony or contention.
Our study opens at least two research directions. First, it would be interesting to carefully look into non-atomic semantics, e.g., regular or safe storage [17] . Recent results (in the threshold-based context) suggest that some (yet not all) properties of our refined quorum system are necessary and sufficient even for achieving optimal best-case complexity of weaker object implementations. Namely [2, 12] suggest that Properties 1 and 3a of RQS are necessary and sufficient for non-atomic best-case efficient storage implementations. These properties correspond to the special case of RQS where QC1 = ∅. Second, it would also be interesting to look into atomic object implementations that use data authentication in best-case executions.
The lower bounds of [19] , stated in the threshold-based context, suggest that Properties 1 and 2 are necessary and sufficient for best-case efficient and optimally resilient consensus implementations regardless of whether authentication is used in the best-case. These properties correspond to the special case of RQS where QC2 = QC1. This suggests a general RQS-based framework for optimally efficient and resilient distributed objects, parameterized by the use of authentication and the desire for atomicity.
